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Incentives and disincentives 
A B S T R A C T   
It is challenging to engage customers in demand response programs, which require significant interventions in 
customers’ normal energy consumption patterns. Moreover, little is known about how customers can be moti-
vated to adopt innovations that promote collective benefits. This research investigates the effectiveness of the 
two most basic elements of incentive-based policies — reward and punishment — with regard to customer 
participation in the sustainable energy domain. We counter the prevailing assumptions in innovation and 
technology research that favor the use of reward rather than punishment to engage customers. Based on a series 
of experimental studies, we find mixed evidence. It appears that punishment is at least as effective as reward in 
engaging customers in sustainable technology innovations. Even more importantly, both reward and punishment 
are shown to overcome concerns relating to technology. Moderated mediation reveals that economic incentives 
and disincentives ameliorate critical obstacles because customers more strongly favor their own personal benefit 
over the collective benefit and are more willing for ‘self-serving’ reasons to adopt technology that contributes to 
collective benefits. The findings of this research thus have novel practical and theoretical implications for energy 
innovation involving customers.   
1. Introduction 
Consider the following event that motivated this research: An elec-
tricity provider was looking for an effective strategy to attract con-
sumers to join its demand response (DR) program. While offering 
monetary rewards was one option for the provider, this was eventually 
ruled out by the managers as this type of incentive is too expensive to 
stimulate engagement in these programs on a larger scale. Punishments 
were contemplated as an alternative option because this appears to be 
effective in other domains (e.g., road traffic) where desired behavior is 
not rewarded but rather undesired behavior is punished (e.g., speeding). 
Nonetheless, the intuition of the management was that punishments 
might not be suited to engage consumers in an energy context. Even 
more so, conventional wisdom may suggest that consumers respond very 
negatively to such incentives, developing a feeling of unfairness, which 
ultimately damages their relationship with the company. But is this 
managerial intuition actually accurate? 
Consumer engagement and energy behavior is a central debate in 
energy and social sciences. Energy behavior is analyzed based on energy 
use characteristics [1] and through the application of machine learning 
[2]. Studies from the United Kingdom have revealed particularities of 
energy behavior in relation to different levels of grid connectivity [3], 
and it is well known that social psychological factors are impactful for 
the acceptance of smart meters [4]. Additionally, larger reviews have 
shown the relevance of energy social science research in household 
energy behavior interventions [5]. 
Overall, it remains challenging to engage consumers more actively in 
the energy system, although they are increasingly playing an active and 
decisive role in innovation development [7]. This role for consumers has 
been found to be important in new product development [8,9] as 
embedded lead users [10]. Shifting the focus towards a “customer-active 
paradigm” [11], researchers have considered customer engagement in 
value creation in a variety of contexts. Although engaging consumers 
appears to be a central issue in innovation management, knowledge of 
how to do it is sparse. Thus far, rather few studies have investigated 
personal traits and the effect of this on innovation success [12], or have 
examined how innovation can facilitate the engagement of customers in 
value creation (e.g., contributions to firm-hosted user communities 
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[14]). 
Research into innovation involving customers predominantly looks 
at industries in which willingness-to-engage is generally high, and has 
ranged from open-source software innovation [14], to mountain-biking 
[15], computer-controlled musical instruments [13], and all-terrain 
vehicles [16]. Given this selection of industries, in which participation 
seems to be intrinsically motivated, identifying how to engage cus-
tomers appears to be less necessary. As a result, the different mecha-
nisms that drive customer co-production [17] and the boundary 
conditions that produce willingness to co-create among individuals [18] 
remain largely unexplored. 
This is particularly true for domains in which the general interest of 
consumers is low but information is required, such as those involving 
pro-social products or services. Especially in the context of sustainability 
innovation, innovation sometimes requires customers to make trade-offs 
that are undesirable. In the energy industry, for instance, increasing the 
share of fluctuating renewable energy production requires customers to 
participate more actively in value creation and capture in the power 
sector [19–21]. Sometimes this comes at the cost of convenience: a 
disadvantage for customers [22] which reduces willingness to adopt 
such technologies. Managing this challenge requires novel insights into 
how customers can be stimulated to engage “for the greater good”; that 
is, how better to balance short-term individual disadvantage and long- 
term (ecological) benefits. Unfortunately, customers appear to be rela-
tively hesitant to take a more active role in sustainable energy innova-
tion and to engage in adopting sustainable solutions with utility 
companies. 
This paper contributes to managing this problem by addressing the 
question of how to engage customers in sustainable energy markets. The 
present research is embedded in the context of DR programs for which 
consumer engagement is a particular challenge [6]. DR programs are 
expected to operate as a policy framework for organizing consumer 
engagement (for a description of such programs, see appendix). As we 
spell out in the theory section of this paper, one approach to designing 
DR programs follows the traditional economic perspective and predicts 
that associated price effects trigger behavior change [23,24]. In 
contrast, the behavioral view suggests that psychological mechanisms 
may be intertwined with incentives and disincentives to shape sustain-
able consumer behavior [25,26], while individual-level variability plays 
a role in determining their efficacy. We contribute a micro-level inte-
gration of these two perspectives. A series of studies explored how and 
which customers can most effectively be incentivized through specific 
policies to take part in DR programs [27,28]. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes an interdisci-
plinary review of the current body of research and develops a theoretical 
framework about the effectiveness of reward and punishment in stim-
ulating co-creation in domains with significant societal implications. 
Section 3 reports the design and procedure of our three experimental 
studies and presents the main results. We conclude in section 4 by dis-
cussing implications for the development of effective incentive schemes 
in sustainable innovation involving customers and further research. 
2. Theory 
2.1. The crucial role of active consumers in sustainability solutions 
Innovative business models provide novel solutions for accommo-
dating large shares of renewable energy [20]. One such solution are DR 
programs in which customers and companies cooperate in novel ways to 
create value by re-organizing supply and demand in a flexible manner. 
According to the US-Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DR can be 
defined as “changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their 
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of 
electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed to induce lower 
electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when system 
reliability is jeopardized” [29]. For example, such programs would 
allow for excess solar energy in the grid to be used, or prevent energy 
shortages at different times of the day. This could involve running a 
dishwasher only at times when there is enough energy available from 
renewable energy sources. An exemplary description of a DR program, 
wherein the energy provider controls a household electrical appliance, is 
provided in the appendix (which also served as an explanation of the DR 
concept for the participants in the experimental studies that are later 
presented). While DR defines the arena in which innovation and pro-
duction with customers happens, it is less clear how to motivate cus-
tomers effectively to take part in DR programs. We draw on behavioral 
theory insights differentiating the impact on human behavior by 
different forms of intervention [5]. Our initial hypothesis is that in-
terventions will improve individual participation in demand response 
programs. In the following section, we provide a review of the most 
basic policy instruments for engaging consumers. 
2.2. Policy instruments: The instrumental effects of reward and 
punishment 
Reward and punishment are the two fundamental policy options that 
are employed to stimulate specific behaviors of individuals and groups 
of consumers. The effectiveness of such incentives and disincentives can 
be explained using competing perspectives. 
From a classical economic perspective, monetary incentives and 
disincentives are instruments that modify behavior through price effects 
[30,31,24,26]. Rewards or fines imposed for specific behavior affect the 
cognitive cost-benefit calculations of the utility-maximizing individual 
and are undertaken more or less consciously. Such rational consider-
ations make the targeted behavior more (reward) or less (punishment) 
attractive [23]. Various studies provide evidence that rewards are 
especially capable of stimulating a target behavior, such as engaging in 
cooperation [32–34] (for an overview see [23]), health behavior (e.g., 
[35,36]), and environmental conservation [24,37–40]). 
According to interdependence theory, incentives and disincentives 
are effective tools for solving social dilemmas and reduce the discrep-
ancy between personal benefit and collective benefit [23]. For example, 
a behavioral change that promotes collective benefits, such as switching 
to sustainable products and services, often entails short-term costs for 
the individual. As a consequence, the self-interest in behavioral change 
that creates collective long-term benefits can be rather low. The intro-
duction of economic incentives and disincentives increases self-interest 
and therefore potentially reduces the conflict between personal benefit 
and collective benefit [23,41]. Furthermore, the higher the rewards or 
punishments are, the greater their effectiveness at guiding behavior is 
expected to be, from the classical economic perspective [42]. Various 
studies provide evidence that larger incentives or disincentives are 
indeed more effective than smaller ones [43–46]. 
2.3. Psychological effects of reward and punishment 
The effectiveness of reward and punishment can also be approached 
from a psychological perspective [24,26,31,47–50]. It appears that 
various mechanisms can enhance, reduce or even undermine price ef-
fects [31]. The risk that incentive-based policies with extrinsic financial 
motivators backfire can be explained by the fact that they potentially 
crowd out any initial intrinsic motivation [31,47,51–57]. This 
crowding-out effect occurs when extrinsic motivators—economic in-
centives or disincentives—undermine intrinsic motivation. In some 
cases, this can even have negative effects on the targeted behavioral 
change, such as decreasing recycling behavior [54]. Economic in-
centives and disincentives may also provoke psychological reactance 
[58,59] when they are perceived as being intrusive and controlling. In 
such cases, individuals may reduce their effort (or simply not engage in 
the intended behavior) as they find their initial intrinsic motivation is 
not acknowledged [54]. This situation can be attributed to the fact that 
incentives or disincentives signal distrust [26] and the fact that 
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individuals perceive them as a threat to their personal freedom [58]. 
Also, subjective perceptions of self-determination are negatively 
affected [59,60] when external incentives or disincentives are inter-
preted as being controlling. 
There is ample evidence that extrinsic motivators in the form of 
financial rewards or punishments can have negative effects on envi-
ronmental decision making due to the crowding-out effect [54]. Frey 
and Stutzer show that the introduction of monetary incentives or dis-
incentives can also be supportive in the long run [48]. Introducing a 
reward for pro-environmental behavior or punishing people who do not 
perform a specified behavior can help to overcome free-riding and 
related rationalizations, such as concerns that other people will free-ride 
[48,61]. Furthermore, incentives as well as disincentives can be inter-
preted as signals of social norms [24,40,50]. 
It is considered of particular importance that financial rewards or 
punishments may undermine the desired behavioral effect if they shift 
the decision mindset from ethical or social framing to an economic 
framing [62–64]. Correspondingly, scholars find that the provision of 
financial incentives shifts people’s mindset from a social one to an 
economic one, and as a result, individuals attach more importance to the 
magnitude of the incentive [46]. This shift towards economic reasoning 
following the introduction of small incentives can have a negative effect 
on the intended behavior. When economic reasoning is prevalent, small 
fines might signal that the behavior that was responsible for the sanction 
is not so unfavorable, making the punishment the price of such behavior, 
thereby releasing individuals from perceiving moral responsibility 
[43,44,48]. Similarly, small rewards can signal that the target behavior 
is not overly important [45,62]. In the following section, we embed 
these two overarching perspectives to understand better how incentive 
policies can stimulate the adoption of a sustainable technology that re-
quires a significant modification of customers’ habitual consumptions 
patterns. 
2.4. Sustainable DR programs: Reward vs. punishment? 
In the context of sustainable DR programs, the question arises 
whether to employ positive incentives based on rewarding participating 
customers, or sanction-based policies that use punishments. A meta- 
analysis by Balliet et al. [23] indicates that incentives and disincen-
tives are equally effective, but punishments have a slightly greater effect 
on transforming the behavior of individuals. This slightly greater effect 
may be explained by the principal and widely acknowledge premises of 
prospect theory. While individuals are likely to perceive rewards as 
gains, punishments are likely to be considered losses, which are known 
to have greater implications for behavior change [65–67]. The steeper 
value function for losses and loss aversion suggests that individuals will 
be more likely to comply with requests when they can avoid losses 
compared to when they can make equivalent gains [65,66]. Hence, the 
effects of rewards and punishments are asymmetrical. Greitemeyer and 
Meyer [68,69] demonstrate the existence of such asymmetrical patterns 
and observe that the avoidance of punishment is a stronger external 
motivator than striving to obtain a reward. 
When confronted with a punishment, Mulder demonstrates that 
people are more likely to perceive the targeted behavior as obligatory, 
whereas in a reward situation the target behavior is perceived as being 
voluntary [70]. Punishments therefore outperform rewards in commu-
nicating moral or social norms [70]. However, for punishments to be 
more effective than rewards at fostering moral engagement and inter-
nalizing a targeted behavior, incentives have to be placed in a moral 
context and should not be perceived as being too harsh [70,71]. Recent 
research provides evidence for these observations by demonstrating that 
policies based on punishment are more readily accepted than policies 
that reward if the relevant behavior is obligatory, rather than voluntary 
[72]. 
Beyond communicating social norms, asymmetries might be ex-
pected because of the effects of negativity. That is, punishments should 
be more effective than rewards in shaping behavior because negative 
events are generally known to have a stronger effect than positive events 
[73]. Yet, for the very same reason, punishments may be more likely to 
have negative side effects, can be perceived of as hostile acts, and thus 
inhibit reciprocity and cooperation [31]. Compared to rewards, pun-
ishments are therefore more likely to provoke reactance [74,75] and 
negative affect [76,77]. However, such negative side effects might only 
arise if the targeted behavior is perceived as being voluntary rather than 
obligatory [70,72], and thus the punishment is perceived as being unfair 
[78–81]. Having discussed the mechanisms determining the implica-
tions of monetary rewards and punishments, we next discuss the critical 
conditions under which these incentive policies are effective at stimu-
lating the adoption by customers of sustainable technologies, and more 
specifically, DR programs. 
2.5. Customer concern mitigates the effectiveness of policy instruments 
Emerging sustainability innovations, such as DR programs, are often 
relatively new to customers and require the use of complex technologies 
that are not yet widely known among the general population. Such in-
novations are therefore likely to evoke concerns in consumers. These 
concerns, for example, may be related to loss of control over household 
appliances or data security [19,82–84]. Consumers may share similar 
concerns with regard to DR programs which may be expected to qualify 
the effectiveness of incentive-based policies (punishments and rewards). 
Frey and Stutzer argue that crowding out only occurs under conditions 
when the pro-environmental action involves a low-cost decision [48]. 
For decisions involving high costs, the intrinsic motivation to act in an 
environmentally friendly manner may not suffice to change behavior 
[48,85]. If consumers are significantly concerned regarding a DR pro-
gram, it is harder for them to overcome these concerns and join it. Put 
differently, such concerns boost the individual (mental) cost of joining a 
DR program and thus constitute a barrier [86], reducing the likelihood 
that people will engage in the target behavior [86]. We hypothesize that 
it is particularly in this scenario when an economic incentive or disin-
centive can foster motivation to participate in DR programs. This 
assumption is based on the fact that DR programs increase the benefits of 
a targeted behavior and thus help to overcome barriers resulting from a 
high level of concern [86]. 
In summary, both reward and punishment are expected to elicit a 
positive effect on intentions to participate in DR programs due to the 
price effect [24], which reduces the discrepancy between collective 
benefit and personal benefit [23]. However, the effectiveness of in-
centives is not universal and, critically, depends on the individual that is 
required to adopt the sustainable technology (and thereby substantially 
modify normal consumption patterns). It is our fundamental assumption 
that the effect of incentives and disincentives on the intention-to-join a 
DR program also depends on the concerns that consumers have in regard 
to the DR program. This effect should be particularly prominent for 
those customers with a high level of concern compared to those with 
lower concerns. One reason is that in the former case monetary in-
centives can help to overcome concerns and are less likely to crowd out 
intrinsic motivation. Economic incentives or disincentives more strongly 
push such customers towards acting for personal interest over collective 
interest. In response to punishments and rewards, it is the particularly 
concerned individual who may become more willing to adopt a tech-
nology that contributes to the collective interest. These assumptions are 
tested in a series of experiments. 
3. Experimental studies 
A series of experimental studies investigated the effectiveness of 
punishment and reward on increasing customers’ willingness to join DR 
programs. The current research is located in the domain of energy 
consumption in Switzerland where consumer participation in such 
programs is of pivotal importance for promotion collective interests (e. 
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g., reducing pollution and related impacts on society). To draw con-
clusions about the potential negative side effects of punishments, we 
also investigate the effect of reward and punishment on loyalty towards 
the energy provider that offers them, and on the perception of the 
fairness of such offers. We opted to use participation in a fully DR pro-
gram as the decision problem, which defines the context for all the ex-
periments described in the following. 
3.1. Study 1 
3.1.1. Objective 
Study 1 was designed to investigate the potential of economic in-
centives and disincentives for encouraging customers to participate in 
DR programs. The investigation also explores the reason why reward 
and punishment are effective. In addition, we also test our theoretical 
proposal that economic incentives and disincentives are particularly 
effective at modifying the behavior of customers with a high level of 
concern about technology because their focus is shifted towards self- 
serving goals rather than the need to contribute to collective goals. 
3.1.2. Participants and design 
A total of 154 undergraduates from a Swiss university participated in 
a laboratory experiment. We employed a between-subject design with 
two experimental groups (punishment vs. reward) and a control group 
that received no incentive. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the groups. Four participants were excluded because they did not 
understand the task, which gave us a total sample size of N = 150 (35.3% 
female and 63.3% male, 1.4% missing; M = 24.33 years old, SD = 2.95, 
2% missing). 
3.1.3. Procedure and materials 
After being exposed to materials that contained the experimental 
manipulation, participants completed a paper-based survey as part of a 
class assignment. Subjects in all groups first read an introduction to DR 
programs and their importance for a sustainable energy future. This 
introduction served two purposes. First, we ensured that the participants 
Table 1 
Regression results (Study 1).   
Intention to join DR program  
B SE t-value p B SE t-value p 
Experimental manipulation 
Constant 4.395 0.217 20.216 *** 4.377 0.203 21.607 *** 
Concerns     -0.658 0.143 −4.602 *** 
Punishment 1.052 0.306 3.440 *** 1.060 0.285 3.719 *** 
Reward 0.534 0.304 1.753 + 0.569 0.284 2.006 * 
Punishment by concern     0.502 0.190 2.638 ** 
Reward by concern     0.444 0.196 2.268 *  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.302 0.399 0.758 ns 
Reward     -0.100 0.413 -0.242 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     1.818 0.410 4.432 *** 
Reward     1.239 0.406 3.051 **  
Self-(vs. collective) interest  
B SE t-value p B SE t-value p 
Experimental manipulation 
Constant 0.672 0.047 14.267 *** 0.671 0.046 14.435 *** 
Concerns     -0.034 0.033 −1.003 ns 
Punishment 0.234 0.066 3.534 *** 0.239 0.065 3.652 *** 
Reward 0.195 0.066 2.963 ** 0.194 0.065 2.973 ** 
Punishment by concern     0.097 0.044 2.224 * 
Reward by concern     0.065 0.045 1.457 ns  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.092 0.092 1.008 ns 
Reward     0.095 0.095 1.003 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     0.385 0.094 4.095 *** 
Reward     0.292 0.093 3.138 **  
Loyalty towards energy provider  
B SE t-value p B SE t-value p 
Experimental manipulation 
Constant 4.971 0.137 36.170 *** 4.966 0.133 37.291 *** 
Concerns     -0.209 0.094 −2.227 * 
Punishment -0.019 0.193 -0.100 ns -0.013 0.187 -0.068 ns 
Reward -0.269 0.192 −1.400 ns -0.243 0.187 −1.304 ns 
Punishment by concern     0.227 0.125 1.813 +
Reward by concern     -0.033 0.129 -0.256 ns  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern level (-1SD)         
Punishment     -0.355 0.262 −1.353 ns 
Reward     -0.194 0.271 -0.714 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     0.330 0.270 1.222 ns 
Reward     -0.293 0.267 −1.098 ns 
Notes. *** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05 + p ≤ 0.1. The control group serves as the reference, all products mean centered for product. 
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understood the concept of DR programs. Second, it highlighted the 
importance of DR programs for a sustainable energy future.1 Accord-
ingly, participants were required to balance personal benefits and col-
lective benefits when confronted with an extrinsic motivator (reward 
and punishment). 
After the introduction, participants were informed that their current 
energy provider was going to introduce a DR program next year. The DR 
program was limited to the automatic control of their dishwasher. 
Subjects were informed that they would be able to override the energy 
provider’s signal twice a month. This description of the DR program was 
supported by visual materials (see Appendix A).2 
Participants in the control group then directly answered the ques-
tions measuring the dependent variables and other measurements after 
reading a description of the DR program. Participants in the experiment 
either received the information that they would get a discount of 50 CHF 
per month (reward condition) off their electricity bill, or that they could 
avoid an extra fee of 50 CHF per month (punishment condition) by 
joining the DR program. As regards the latter, we framed the punish-
ment condition as a negative reinforcement (avoidance of loss) rather 
than a positive punishment (a direct loss) because the former 
strengthens the connection with the desired behavior rather than 
weakening it (Solomon, 2004). 
3.1.4. Measures 
To measure readiness to join the DR program, we adapted a seven- 
point, three-item instrument from White and Peloza [87] which has 
high reliability (α = 0.96). Loyalty towards the energy provider was 
assessed with the help of a scale that consisted of five items (three items 
adapted from Bell, Auh, & Smalley [88], and the first two loyalty items 
by Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman [89], α = 0.80). As the key 
intervening mechanism that is expected to explain the effectiveness of 
the rewards and punishments, we additionally measured the extent to 
which joining automatic DR programs was perceived to benefit the in-
dividual (personal benefit): “I personally benefit if I join the FLEX-Pro-
gram” [90] and the extent to which the program benefits the 
environment and society (collective benefit, α = 0.86): “Through joining 
the FLEX-Program I create benefit for society”, and “Joining the FLEX- 
Program is good for the environment.” Items were answered using seven- 
item Likert scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). To capture the rela-
tive weight of the two types of interest, we calculated the ratio of per-
sonal benefit to collective benefit for further analysis (ratio = benefitpersonalbenefitcollective). 
As the key catalyst that determines the conditions under which eco-
nomic incentives and disincentives may be particularly helpful, we 
measured participants’ concerns regarding joining automated DR pro-
grams. The two-item scale was adapted from Curtius et al. [82]. Answers 
were also provided using seven-point Likert scales (1 = not at all; 7 =
very much; wording: “To what extent do you fear the following when 
thinking about joining the FLEX program?” a) “I will lose control over my 
household appliances”, and b) “I cannot control what happens to my con-
sumption data, and I am afraid that my consumption data will be abused”)3. 
Finally, participants provided socio-demographic information (age, 
gender, and place of residence, etc.). 
3.1.5. Results 
In the first step, regression analyses estimated the effects of the 
experimental factor (reward and punishment, with the control group as 
the reference) on the intention to adopt the automated DR program, the 
ratio of personal benefit to collective benefit, and loyalty towards the 
energy provider. The analysis further examined if the effects of reward 
and punishment on these dependent variables were qualified by cus-
tomers’ concerns towards DR programs (all variables are mean 
centered). Estimation results are presented in Table 1. 
The impact of the monetary incentives and customer concerns 
explained a large share of the variance in intention to join the DR pro-
gram (R2 = 0.21, F(5, 144) = 7.79, p < .001). Evidently, rewards and 
punishments increase intention to join the DR program considerably 
(punishment: B = 1.060, SE = 0.285, t = 3.719, p < .001; reward: B =
0.569, SE = 0.284, t = 2.006, p < .05). We also observe that concerns 
about automated DR programs are a critical obstacle that impairs 
readiness to join such programs (B = -0.658, SE = 0.143, t = -4.602, p <
Fig. 1. Influence of experimental factor on dependent variables (Study 1).  
1 All studies were carried out in Switzerland where energy efficiency has been 
widely discussed in the media and in political debates. The need to act in an 
energy efficient way is widely supported by the population (SRF, 2017).  
2 All study materials were pretested with students to ensure comprehension 
and with an energy provider to ensure accuracy and external validity. 
3 To avoid the experimental manipulation becoming distorted and avoid 
carry-over effects, we used temporal and psychological separation (Podsakof, 
MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003) and measured concerns regarding DR 
programs at the end of the survey. 
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.001). However, as expected within our conceptual framework these 
implications can be substantially reduced with the help of monetary 
incentives or disincentives. Accordingly, the effects of rewards and 
punishments are significantly qualified by customer level of concern 
(punishment × concern: B = 0.502, SE = 0.190, t = 2.638, p < .01; 
reward × concern: B = 0.444, SE = 0.196, t = 2.268, p < .05). As 
highlighted by the conditional effects detailed in Table 1, it is particu-
larly strongly concerned customers for whom punishment (B = 1.818, 
SE = 0.410, t = 4.432, p < .001) and reward (B = 1.239, SE = 0.406, t =
3.051, p < .01) increases the readiness to adopt automated DR programs. 
By contrast, incentives and disincentives did not affect the intention to 
join the DR program for consumers with a low level of concern (p > .1). 
As depicted in Fig. 1a, adoption rates were relatively high for consumers 
with low concerns about the technology, and thus fewer barriers. 
As they might be perceived as unfair or discriminating, we also tested 
if monetary incentives and especially disincentives potentially reduce 
customer loyalty. Again, our model explains a significant proportion of 
variance in loyalty towards the energy provider (R2 = 0.10, F(5, 144) =
3.06, p < .05). However, this finding must be primarily attributed to the 
fact that loyalty towards the provider decreases with elevated levels of 
concern about the technology (B = -0.209, SE = 0.094, t = -2.227, p <
.05). Both rewards and punishments were ineffective at changing loy-
alty, however; a situation which is illustrated in Fig. 1c. This finding 
implies that punishments involve less of a threat of unwanted (negative) 
side effects than originally expected. 
3.1.6. Reasons for the effects of the incentives and disincentives 
In the next step, we examined the reasons why punishment and 
reward are particularly influential regarding subjects who are concerned 
about technology. Interdependence theory argues that incentives and 
disincentives have a positive effect on behavior because they reduce the 
discrepancy between self-interest and collective interest [23]. In line 
with our reasoning, both factors increase the subject’s perceptions of 
personal benefit over collective benefit, captured as the ratio of personal 
to collective benefit (punishment: B = 0.239, SE = 0.065, t = 3.652, p <
.001; reward: B = 0.194, SE = 0.065, t = 2.973, p < .01). Again, we 
observe that this impact is qualified by the level of customer concern 
about DR programs. Although the interaction term does not reach sig-
nificance for rewards (p = .15; punishment: p = .03), the conditional 
effects clearly hint that the impact of punishment (B = 0.385, SE =
0.094, t = 4.095, p < .001) and reward (B = 0.292, SE = 0.093, t =
3.138, p < .01) strongly enhances the dominance of self over collective 
interest, whereas it is nonsignificant for less concerned individuals (ps >
0.32). 
Regression analysis further shows that a higher level of personal 
benefit compared to collective benefit contributes to readiness to join 
the DR program (B = 1.563, SE = 0.354, t = 4.415, p < .001). To test for 
this mechanism, mediation analysis finally examined whether the ratio 
of personal to collective benefit mediates the effect of rewards and 
punishments on intention to join the DR program. In doing this, we 
further explored whether this mediation is qualified by the level of 
customer concern about the technology. Employing the Preacher and 
Hayes [91] bootstrapping procedure (10,000 samples) and the PROCESS 
macro [92], we determined the conditional indirect effects of incentives 
and disincentives (dummy coded with the control group as the refer-
ence) on the adoption of the DR program according to the ratio of per-
sonal to collective benefit, contingent on customer concern. Results 
derived by moderated mediation analysis are presented in Table 2 (the 
full moderated mediation model is provided in Appendix C). For the 
indirect effects, we highlight the different levels of concern (low − 1 SD 
below the mean; moderate – mean; high − 1 SD above the mean). The 
conditional indirect effect is significant if the bias-corrected 95% con-
fidence interval does not include 0 (90% interval for marginal effects). 
The results support the hypothesis: both punishment and reward in-
crease perceptions of personal over collective benefits, particularly for 
customers with strong concern which affects willingness to join the 
automated DR program. Hence, especially for consumers with strong 
doubts and worries, reward and punishment make personal benefit more 
salient than the collective benefit, increasing willingness to participate. 
3.1.7. Robustness check 
It is important to note that the conditional indirect effects reported in 
Table 2 are based on the estimated regressions. An alternative sensitivity 
analysis was therefore conducted to double-check overall findings. To 
this end, a median split was employed to split the sample according to 
subjects’ concern about automated DR programs, and the mediation 
analysis was rerun. As highlighted in Fig. 2, only for the concerned 
subjects can we observe the effect of rewards and punishments on the 
mediating variable (personal vs. collective benefit) that affects readiness 
to join DR programs. Hence, results are stable. 
3.1.8. Discussion 
Study 1 reveals that both punishment and reward are helpful for 
nudging customers towards taking a more active role; namely, adopting 
an automated DR program. Both policy instruments were shown to be 
particularly supportive for customers who have significant concerns or 
worries about the new form of technology, which is a critical obstacle 
that reduces readiness to accept the program. As mediation analysis 
clearly outlines, the efficacy of reward and punishment unfolds because 
both increase the satisfaction of personal over collective benefit. Or, put 
differently, as punishment and reward can increase personal benefit, it is 
especially the hesitant consumers who are more likely moved by the 
economic incentive to adopt a DR program that serves collective in-
terests. For those who are less concerned, rewards and punishments are 
less influential. For these consumers, doubts about the technology are 
much less of a barrier and they are more willing to participate, regard-
less of whether economic incentives or disincentives are involved. 
Remarkably, loyalty towards the company is not damaged by reward nor 
punishment. While this is not surprising for rewards, this is an encour-
aging observation for punishments as conventional wisdom might sug-
gest that they backfire and companies are hesitant to apply them. 
Having revealed that different policy instruments to promote collective 
interests can be beneficially employed, the next stage of the research 
focuses on the magnitude of the reward and punishment. More impor-
tantly, we seek to overcome the particularities of the sample in Study 1. 
Not only are they rather young, students often reside in small and special 
housing arrangements, with low electricity bills that might sometimes 
be paid flat-rate as part of the rent. DR could seem hypothetical to parts 
of this population and some participants might have considered the 
technology relevant especially for their future lives. With Studies 2a/b, 
we explore whether the responses to (dis)incentives also emerge at 
different degrees of rewards or punishments when addressing a repre-
sentative, non-student sample. 
Table 2 
Conditional indirect effects of reward and punishment at different levels of 
concern about automated DR programs (Study 1).   
Effect of reward and punishment on joining automated DR 
programs operating through self-(vs. collective) interest  
Punishment  Reward     
IE SE BS IE SE BS 
Concern about 
automated DR 
programs       
Weak concern 0.115 (0.145)  0.104 (0.141)  
Moderate 
concern 
0.251 (0.133) * 0.305 (0.139) * 
Significant 
concern 
0.432 (0.203) * 0.575 (0.257) * 
Index of moderated 
mediation 
0.091 (0.063) + 0.135 (0.082) * 
Notes. IE… indirect effect, SE… standard error of 95%-confidence interval (CI), 
BS… bootstrapping (10,000 samples), * 95%-CI ∕= 0, + 90%-CI ∕= 0. 
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3.2. Studies 2a and 2b: Small and large rewards and punishments 
To investigate the impact of economic (dis)incentives and to 
strengthen the ecological validity of the observed positive implications 
of punishments, we ran two follow-up studies using a representative 
sample of the population. More precisely, we aimed to test whether 
findings varied with the size of the reward and punishment. The 50 CHF 
per month we used in Study 1 constitutes a very large incentive or 
disincentive as it is >50% of the average energy cost of a typical 
household in Switzerland (Statista, 2016). The magnitude of the 
incentive could thus be perceived as controlling, thereby crowding out 
intrinsic motivation and leading to reactance [24,26,48]. In contrast, 
monetary incentives of a small magnitude are often perceived as less 
controlling than those of a high magnitude, and thus may be less likely 
to evoke this negative effect [48]. Further, small rewards and punish-
ments have the potential to “crowd-in” intrinsic motivation. In contrast 
to crowding-out, crowding-in describes a situation in which extrinsic 
rewards acknowledge and thus reinforce initial intrinsic motivation 
instead of undermining it [24,93]. Small rewards and punishments are 
prone to be perceived as acknowledging and supportive of any initial 
intrinsic motivation, rather than controlling [52,54]. Moreover, earlier 
research suggests that small incentives or disincentives signal social 
norms better than larger ones [24,40,61]. Two follow-up experiments 
were conducted at this second stage of research which either employed 
the larger amount used in Study 1 (Study 2a) or a smaller amount (Study 
2b). As a second central objective, the research extended the experi-
mental design to a broader population. 
3.2.1. Participants and design 
The sample for Stage 2 of the current project consisted of 119 (Study 
2a) and 352 panel participants (Study 2b) that were representative of 
the population in the field of study with regard to age, gender, place of 
residence, and home-ownership (see Appendix D). We used the same 
protocol as in the first stage. Again, we employed a between-subject 
design with two experimental groups (punishment vs. reward) and a 
control group that received no incentive. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one group. 
3.2.2. Procedure and materials 
Panel members participated online in exchange for payment in Study 
2a and 2b (1 CHF per participant). The procedure and materials were the 
same as for Study 1. We systematically varied the magnitude of (dis) 
incentive between the two studies. The amount of reward and punish-
ment in Study 2a was 50 CHF (reward or punishment per month), and 
only 5 CHF in Study 2b.4 
3.2.3. Measures 
Both studies used the same measures as in Study 1 to assess intention 
to join the DR program (α ≥ 0.94) and loyalty towards the energy pro-
vider (α. ≥ 79). As an extension of the previous investigation, we 
included the perception of fairness of the offer to join the DR program as 
a third dependent variable (three bipolar items using a seven-item scale: 
unfair vs. fair; wrong vs. right; unreasonable vs. reasonable; items from 
Campbell [94]). The instrument had a high level of reliability in both 
studies (α ≥ 0.93). Again, we measured the ratio of personal to collective 
benefit (α ≥ 0.92), and a measure of the concern regarding the DR 
program as the relevant moderating variable. Appendix D presents the 
socio-demographic data and further information (e.g., the highest level 
of formal education, income, household size, etc.) that were additionally 
collected for Studies 2a and 2b 
3.2.4. Results 
Regression results of Study 2a and Study 2b are presented in Table 3. 
A significant proportion of the variance in the intention to join the DR 
program was explained in both experiments (Study 2a: R2 = 0.21, F(5, 
113) = 6.16, p < .001; Study 2b: R2 = 0.19, F(5, 346) = 15.82, p < .001). 
Congruently, readiness to join the automated DR program was highly 
significantly reduced in relation to raised levels of consumer concern for 
both large (Study 2a: B = -0.554, SE = 0.140, t = -3.953, p < .001) and 
small economic incentives (Study 2b: B = -0.338, SE = 0.095, t = -3.567, 
p < .001). However, only for the small amount (Study 2b) were we able 
to observe the influence of reward and punishment (punishment: B =
0.693, SE = 0.234, t = 2.962, p < .01; reward: B = 0.398, SE = 0.235, t 
= 1.694, p < .1); except for a marginal main effect for large rewards (B 
= 0.613, SE = 0.365, t = 1.678, p < .1). 
In the follow-up studies, the main effects of rewards and punishment 
(Study 2b) are not contingent on the levels of consumer concern. As 
illustrated in Fig. 3, customers with a low level of concern had generally 
stronger intentions of joining the DR program than consumers who had 
greater concern about such new technologies. Yet, for this 
Fig. 2. Direct and indirect effects of the experimental factor related to level of concern (Study 1, Sub-samples for weak and strong concerns with automated DR 
programs are based on a median split). 
4 Five CHF was considered a small reward or punishment in the focus group 
discussion. 
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Table 3 
Regression results for large (Study 2a) and small (Study 2b) rewards and punishments.  
Study 2a: Large rewards and punishment Intention to join the DR program 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Constant 4.436 0.261 16.967 *** 4.555 0.240 19.008 *** 
Concerns     -0.554 0.140 −3.953 *** 
Punishment 0.393 0.370 1.063 ns 0.422 0.341 1.237 ns 
Reward 0.613 0.365 1.678 + 0.353 0.342 1.031 ns 
Punishment by concern     0.105 0.210 0.502 ns 
Reward by concern     0.282 0.203 1.385 ns  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern-level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.249 0.526 0.472 ns 
Reward     -0.112 0.454 -0.247 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     0.596 0.443 1.347 ns 
Reward     0.818 0.503 1.626 ns   
Loyalty towards energy provider 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Constant 4.846 0.174 27.923 *** 4.869 0.169 28.772 *** 
Concerns     -0.108 0.099 −1.087 ns 
Punishment 0.010 0.245 0.042 ns 0.075 0.241 0.310 ns 
Reward -0.124 0.242 -0.512 ns -0.255 0.242 −1.055 ns 
Punishment according to concern     -0.158 0.148 −1.066 ns 
Reward according to concern     -0.100 0.144 -0.694 ns  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.335 0.372 0.902 ns 
Reward     -0.090 0.321 -0.282 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     -0.186 0.313 -0.594 ns 
Reward     -0.419 0.355 −1.181 ns   
Fairness perception 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Constant 5.154 0.220 23.412 *** 5.259 0.198 26.556 *** 
Concerns     -0.491 0.116 −4.237 *** 
Punishment 0.060 0.311 0.192 ns 0.116 0.282 0.413 ns 
Reward 0.553 0.307 1.800 + 0.422 0.283 1.491 ns 
Punishment according to concern     0.000 0.173 0.000 ns 
Reward according to concern     0.440 0.168 2.616 *  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern-level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.116 0.458 0.254 ns 
Reward     -0.380 0.395 -0.962 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     0.117 0.366 0.319 ns 
Reward     1.147 0.416 2.760 **  
Study 2b: Small rewards and punishment Intention to join the DR program 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Constant 4.034 0.178 22.683 *** 4.121 0.165 24.900 *** 
Concerns     -0.338 0.095 −3.567 *** 
Punishment 0.821 0.253 3.251 *** 0.693 0.234 2.962 ** 
Reward 0.578 0.253 2.285 * 0.398 0.235 1.694 +
Punishment by concern     -0.126 0.139 -0.904 ns 
Reward by concern     -0.200 0.133 −1.498 ns  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern-level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.909 0.342 2.662 ** 
Reward     0.741 0.332 2.232 * 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     0.477 0.327 1.456 ns 
Reward     0.055 0.324 0.169 ns   
Loyalty towards energy provider 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Constant 4.931 0.107 45.942 *** 4.935 0.108 45.630 *** 
Concerns     -0.014 0.062 -0.218 ns 
Punishment 0.096 0.152 0.631 ns 0.081 0.153 0.528 ns 
Reward 0.157 0.153 1.027 ns 0.142 0.153 0.922 ns 
Punishment according to concern     -0.123 0.091 −1.346 ns 
Reward according to concern     -0.054 0.087 -0.625 ns  
(continued on next page) 
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representative sample of the population in Study 2a, monetary in-
centives and disincentives seem to be much less powerful than observed 
in Study 1. Nonetheless, the pattern illustrated in Fig. 3 may hint to a 
slight trend of reward and punishment for consumers, particularly for 
consumers with a high level of concern, albeit these effects do not reach 
significance (punishment: B = 0.596, SE = 0.443, t = 1.347, p = .181; 
reward: B = 0.818, SE = 0.503, t = 1.626, p = .107). 
For small rewards and punishments (Study 2b), on the other hand, 
we observed an incentive-induced increase in the intention to join the 
automated DR program. Note that these effects observed for the rather 
small amount were not contingent on the user’s level of concern 
(interaction effects for punishment: B = -0.126, SE = 0.139, t = -0.904, 
p > .05; reward: B = -0.200, SE = 0.133, t = -1.498, p > .05). The 
average indirect effects suggest that the direct effects of rewards and 
punishments can be explained by a shift in the focus towards satisfying 
self over collective interest (Table 3). The conditional effects are pre-
sented in Table 4 (Appendix E for the full Study 2a and 2b models). 
While the reward and punishment were rather ineffective in Study 2a, 
both types of incentives fostered the participant’s intention to join the 
automated DR program in Study 2b. This can be seen through the highly 
significant shift from personal to collective benefits (indirect effects for 
punishment: IE = 0.200, SE = 0.085, p < .01; reward: B = 0.259, SE =
0.093, p < .01). Note, Table 4 also shows the conditional indirect effects, 
although the index of moderation is not significant, such that the 
interpretation needs to focus on the average indirect effect. 
Additionally, a closer look at the impacts of the incentives and dis-
incentives did not reveal that punishments are more or less effective 
than rewards of smaller or larger amounts (Studies 1, 2a and 2b: ps >
0.05). Also, regarding the possibility of ‘backfiring’ effects on customer 
loyalty towards the energy provider or perceptions of fairness, we could 
not observe significant effects for punishment nor reward (ps > 0.1). 
Note that concerns about the technology were found to reduce percep-
tions of fairness towards the energy provider in both studies (Study 2a: 
B = –0.491, SE = 0.116, t = -4.237, p < .001; Study 2b: B = -0.288, SE =
0.075, t = -3.812, p < .001). This stresses the importance to consider 
customer concerns in this domain. In one condition, rewards were even 
able to increase perceptions of fairness for consumers with high con-
cerns when they are big enough (Study 2a: B = 1.147, SE = 0.416, t =
2.760, p < .01; Study 2b: B = 0.354, SE = 0.258, t = 1.372, p > .05). 
Overall, and similarly to Study 1, these results of Study 2a and 2b do not 
provide evidence to support the existence of marked negative side ef-
fects in terms of motivating consumers to join DR-programs. Aside from 
participation intentions, we did not observe any negative imprint on 
perceived fairness or loyalty to the provider, regardless of consumer’s 
level of concern. While this lack of negative impact is not surprising for 
rewards, it is intriguing that punishments—to a certain extent—appear 
to be accepted, even increasing consumers’ intentions to join the auto-
mated DR program when they are not too high (i.e., significant effect in 
Study 2b). 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
The research was designed to improve our understanding of the 
different ways to motivate people to take a more active role in the en-
ergy industry. More specifically, the research focused on encouraging 
customers to join DR programs. In Studies 1 and 2b, we found that the 
two most basic classes of policy instruments — punishment and reward 
— can be effective tools for increasing involvement and motivating the 
adoption of automated DR systems. This is a notable observation 
because conventional wisdom may suggest that negatively-oriented 
policy instruments produce the opposite effect and punishments 
generally demotivate consumers. However, we obtained consistent ev-
idence across the three studies that this does not appear to be the case. In 
none of the studies, involving different populations and different 
amounts of the incentives, did we observe the negative effects of pun-
ishments. It is important to mention that this tool did not differ sub-
stantially from the more positively-oriented incentive that can involve 
considerable costs to energy providers. In addition to adoption in-
tentions, we observed no negative effects on customer loyalty or fairness 
perceptions. This implies that the threat of punishments, at least in the 
domain of automated DR programs, may be less imminent than origi-
nally thought or even overestimated. 
Yet, as suggested by the findings, the effectiveness of rewards and 
punishments can depend on individual differences. Customers, 
evidently, vary in the extent to which they hold concerns and doubts 
regarding DR programs that are implemented and often marketed with 
environmental purposes. Given that behavior is often more strongly 
guided by personal (rather than altruistic) motivation, it was the basic 
premise of this research that economic incentives play a role in shifting 
attention such that they associate this technological solution with 
Table 3 (continued ) 
Study 2b: Small rewards and punishment Intention to join the DR program 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.291 0.223 1.304 ns 
Reward     0.235 0.217 1.083 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     -0.130 0.214 -0.606 ns 
Reward     0.048 0.212 0.227 ns   
Fairness perception 
Experimental manipulation B SE t p B SE t p 
Constant 4.978 0.139 35.814 *** 5.052 0.132 38.271 *** 
Concerns     -0.288 0.075 −3.812 *** 
Punishment 0.413 0.197 2.091 * 0.306 0.187 1.637 ns 
Reward 0.471 0.198 2.379 * 0.347 0.187 1.853 +
Punishment according to concern     -0.084 0.111 -0.752 ns 
Reward according to concern     0.004 0.106 0.039 ns  
Conditional effects for different concern levels 
low concern-level (-1SD)         
Punishment     0.449 0.272 1.648 ns 
Reward     0.340 0.265 1.284 ns 
high concern level (+1SD)         
Punishment     0.162 0.261 0.621 ns 
Reward     0.354 0.258 1.372 ns 
Notes. *** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05 + p ≤ 0.1. 
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greater personal over collective benefit. In Study 1, we found evidence of 
this incentive-induced shift; consumers perceived increasing personal 
benefits of DR programs compared to collective benefit. That is, the 
economic incentives made them to interpret automated DR programs 
more strongly in terms of personal benefit and less in terms of collective 
benefits. This applied particularly to customers with significant concerns 
or doubts about this technology. More concerned consumers perceive 
greater personal costs (which is what makes them concerned) and these 
greater personal costs can be balanced by personal benefits. Such 
balancing is not needed and, hence, less likely to occur for less con-
cerned consumers. Likewise in Study 2b, we observed that this shift 
towards perceiving greater personal over collective benefits explains the 
effects of rewards and punishments on customer’s adoption intentions. 
Note, when comparing the studies using a representative sample of 
the relevant population (Studies 2a and 2b), only small rewards and 
punishments proved effective. The results may suggest that economic 
incentives and disincentives affect behavioral intention when they are 
small, rather than large (Study 2a vs 2b). It is possible that smaller in-
centives are generally perceived to be less controlling [48], and are 
therefore more effective at crowding in intrinsic motivation due to their 
potential to signal social norms and their expressive function 
[24,40,54,61]. We propose that the small incentives and disincentives 
employed in our studies did not modify behavioral intentions due to a 
shift towards economic reasoning, which has been shown to decrease 
feelings of moral responsibility [46,48]. Considering the mixed evidence 
on the amount of economic (dis)incentives in our research, we call for 
further studies on the matter. Nevertheless, with the incentive-induced 
shift in perceptions of personal and collective benefits, this investiga-
tion allowed to shed some light into the mechanism by which they 
operate. In this regard, it is a very interesting finding that both rewards 
and punishment — albeit conceptually very different — were found to 
raise customer’s perception of personal over collective benefit. Also, the 
observed differences for the various samples in this research highlight 
that the economic incentives and disincentives can be differently 
effective in the marketing of environmentally-friendly technologies and 
encouraging sustainability innovations involving customers. We 
collected data from very diverse samples (students, representative for 
the population) that principally vary in age, shared values as well as 
living situation and financial status, among others. Nonetheless, even in 
the general population, we did not observe a boomerang effect of eco-
nomic disincentives that appears to prevent some providers from 
adopting this tool. 
Fig. 3. Means of intention to join, loyalty towards energy provider, and fairness perception across treatments (Studies 2a and 2b).  
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4.1. Managerial implications 
Building on our findings, we advise policy makers and practitioners 
as well as researchers to take into account the use of both rewards and 
punishments when considering the most effective design for incentive 
schemes. Our results indicate that negative side effects of punishments 
might be less of a threat than originally thought, at least in the context of 
automated DR programs. We find that punishments are as effective as 
rewards in terms of increasing behavioral intentions, and appear to not 
jeopardize customer loyalty. While the initial costs of the implementa-
tion of sanction-related schemes may be higher because of the sub-
stantially greater communication efforts needed to prevent negative 
media coverage and strong reactance, punishment as a policy instru-
ment is more cost efficient in the long run [7,42,95]. Punishment-based 
programs are not associated with variable costs as these do not increase 
or decrease with the number of individuals who comply with them. By 
contrast, the cost of reward schemes increases substantially when more 
individuals perform the rewarded behavior. Consequently, maintaining 
a punishment-based incentive structure may be easier and more cost 
efficient in the long run. The latter might also be found preferable for use 
in innovation processes with customers because they regulate free- 
riding [48,61,96]. Nevertheless, it cannot be stressed enough that 
ethical issues that may arise should be considered. For this reason, the 
results of the research described herein should not be considered to 
apply to products or services that are of critical importance to humans 
(e.g., health services) and/or situations in which the use of punishment 
would contradict ethical principles (e.g., would discriminate against 
specific groups of customers). 
4.2. Limitations and avenues for further research 
Although we conducted a series of studies involving experimental 
manipulations of rewards and punishments, we acknowledge that the 
experimental design did not involve observations of real behavior. We 
therefore welcome further research that could complement our experi-
mental approach, such as investigations of how forms of punishment are 
employed and communicated (e.g., as taxes, fees, fines, or service costs) 
[97]. An improved future study of behavior could also involve other 
types of models [98]. Further, of great interest is to gain understanding 
about any potential spillover effects. This would provide answers to 
questions such as: Do monetary sanctions trigger or inhibit spillover 
effects on non-intended behaviors? If punishments communicate a social 
norm and rewards do not, is it plausible that disincentives are more 
effective at increasing positive behavioral-reaction-related spillovers? 
[99,100]. In addition, who should introduce the incentive schemes, and 
should these actors be different in the case of the introduction of pun-
ishment and reward schemes [23,70]? What precise theory explains and 
predicts more narrowly the effects of different types of incentives? Our 
research made use of a scenario-based technique, which should be 
extended to other techniques and sampling methods. For example, it is 
possible that the lack of meaningful effects on loyalty is due to the nature 
of the method or the sample that was obtained (e.g., some participants 
might not have a relationship with an energy provider because of their 
current living situation, such as students residing in certain housing 
arrangements that often include electricity flat-rates as part of the rent). 
Finally, and of special interest to the energy sector, future research 
should test the sensitivity of our results with regard to different designs 
of DR programs, such as DR programs in which customers react to sig-
nals (e.g., text messages) by personally switching an appliance on or off, 
which requires greater effort. 
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Table 4 
Conditional indirect effects of reward and punishment for Study 2a and Study 2b.   
Effect of reward and punishment on joining automated DR programs operating through self-(vs. collective) interest  
Punishment  Reward    
Substantial monetary incentive (Study 2a) IE SE BS IE SE BS 
Average indirect effect 0.031 0.083  0.052 0.083  
Concerns about automated DR programs 
Weak concern 0.029 (0.091)  0.028 (0.065)  
Moderate concern 0.022 (0.054)  0.020 (0.051)  
Significant concern 0.014 (0.102)  0.013 (0.077)  
Index of moderated mediation -0.004 0.049  -0.005 0.030    
Punishment Reward 
Small monetary incentive (Study 2b) IE SE BS IE SE BS 
Average indirect effect 0.200 0.085 ** 0.259 0.093 ** 
Concerns about automated DR programs 
Weak concern 0.135 (0.090) + 0.195 (0.103) * 
Moderate concern 0.166 (0.074) * 0.216 (0.082) * 
Significant concern 0.197 (0.105) * 0.236 (0.126) +
Index of moderated mediation 0.018 0.037  0.012 (0.046)  
Notes. IE… indirect effect, SE… standard error of 95%-confidence interval (CI), BS… bootstrapping (10,000 samples), * 95%-CI ∕= 0, + 90%-CI ∕= 0. Conditional indirect 
effects are just presented for informative reasons. 
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Appendix A. – Study materials 
Translated from German 
Introduction and description of demand response program 
With “Energiewende”, the Swiss government aims at making possible a sustainable and secure energy supply from renewable energy sources in the future. One 
way to reach this goal is to introduce programs that balance the demand and supply of renewable energy. Such programs rely on flexibility with the energy 
consumption of consumers (Demand-Response). For example, such programs would allow for excess solar energy in the grid to be used, or prevent energy 
shortages at different times of the day (e.g. running the dishwasher only at times when there is enough energy available from renewable energy sources). For such 
programs to work, consumers would need to allow their energy provider to control their appliances. 
A scenario for such an energy consumption flexibility program is described below: 
Please imagine that your current energy provider wants to introduce this program. Think about how you would react as a customer in a liberalized 
energy market (meaning that you can easily and at any time change your energy provider). 
****** 
Your energy provider will introduce a program to improve the flexibility of energy consumption next year: the FLEX-Program. This program will 
allow you to use electricity from renewable resources more efficiently. 
What does this mean for you? 
Your dishwasher will be equipped (free of charge) with a WLAN signal receiver to allow the automatic control of the device5. If you switch on your 
dishwasher, it may be that the washing program will not start immediately. Depending on whether there is enough electricity from renewable sources 
available in the grid, your energy provider will send a signal to a smart meter to automatically start your dishwasher’s washing program. Through this 
automatic steering process it may take longer until your dishes are clean. However, it will be guaranteed that the washing program will automatically 
be started within 6 h, so that it does not take>8 h for your dishes to be cleaned. Twice per month you will have the opportunity to start your washing 
program independently – and thus prevent the automatic control of your dishwasher – by pushing a button on a mobile app, on an online portal, or by 
pushing a button on the dishwasher (Fig. A1). 
Fig. A1. Illustration. Note. In Study 2a, the DR program did not allow the subject to override the signal from the energy provider and manually operate the 
dishwasher. Thus, the DR program in Study 2a was slightly more controlling than the one described in Study 1. 
5 The automatic steering process via WLAN was developed in cooperation with manufacturers and will not affect the proper operating mode and lifetime of your 
device. 
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Appendix B. – Experimental manipulations 
You now can decide whether you wish to participate in the FLEX-Program or not. 
Control group: / 
Reward Group: If you join the FLEX-Program and allow your dishwasher to be steered automatically by your energy provider, you will receive a 
discount of 50 CHF per month on your electricity bill. 
Punishment Group: If you join the FLEX-Program and allow your dishwasher to be steered automatically by your energy provider, you can prevent 
an additional fee of 50 CHF per month on your electricity bill. 
Appendix C. – Full moderated mediation Models: Study 1   
Ratio of personal benefit to collective benefit (mediator)  
R2 = 0.13, F(5, 144) = 4.33, p < .01  
B SE t-value p 
Constant 0.671 0.046 14.435 *** 
Punishment 0.239 0.065 3.652 *** 
Concern -0.034 0.033 −1.003 ns 
Punishment by concern 0.097 0.044 2.224 * 
Reward 0.194 0.065 2.973 ** 
Reward by concern 0.065 0.045 1.457 ns   
Intention to join DR program (dependent variable)  
R2 = 0.29, F(6, 143) = 9.85, p < .001  
B SE t-value p 
Constant 3.447 0.301 11.434 *** 
Punishment 0.729 0.284 2.572 * 
Reward 0.301 0.278 1.082 ns 
Ratio of personal benefit to collective benefit 1.386 0.346 4.011 *** 
Concern -0.611 0.137 −4.475 *** 
Punishment by concern 0.368 0.184 1.996 * 
Reward by concern 0.353 0.187 1.883 +
Notes. *** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05 + p ≤ 0.1. 
Appendix D. – Demographic data: Studies 2a & 2b   
Study 2a Study 2b 
Gender* 47,1% Male, 
52.9% Female 
43.8% Male,  
55.1% Female;  
Missing: 1.1% 
Age 3.4% below 20 years;  
31.1% between 20 and 30;  
17.6% between 31 and 40;  
20.2% between 41 and 50;  
23.5% between 51 and 65;  
4.2% above 65 years 
2.8% below 20 years;  
20.7% between 20 and 30;  
21.6% between 31 and 40;  
22.2% between 41 and 50;  
28.4% between 51 and 65;  
4.3% above 65 years 
Place of residence 41.2% city;  
57.1% countryside 
1.7% missing 
41.2% city;  
58% countryside 
0.8% missing 
Renting vs. home-ownership 62.2% rent;  
37% home-ownership;  
0.8% missing 
63.9% rent;  
35% home-ownership;  
1.1% missing 
Household size 24.4% 1 person household 
38.6% 2 person household 
11.8% 3 person household 
24.4% 4 or more person-household 
0.8% missing 
22.2% 1 person household 
34.6% 2 person household 
19% 3 person household 
22.2% 4 or more person-household 
2% missing 
Highest level of education 0.8% primary school 
5.9% some high-school 
56.3% professional school 
14.3% high-school degree 
17.6% university 
5.1% other 
1.7% primary school 
2.5% some high-school 
50.9% professional school 
9.4% high-school degree 
30.1% university 
5.4% other 
Monthly net-Income 32.8% below 5,000 CHF 
49.6% 5,001–10,000 CHF 
6.7% 10,001–15,000 CHF 
4.2% 15,001–20,000 CHF 
4.2% above 20,000 CHF 
2.5% missing 
28.4% below 5,000 CHF 
46% 5,001–10,000 CHF 
15.3% 10,001–15,000 CHF 
3.7% 15,001–20,000 CHF 
4.3% above 20,000 CHF 
2.3% missing   
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Appendix E. – Full moderated mediation Models: Studies 2a & 2b   
Ratio of personal benefit to collective benefit (mediator)  
Study 2a Study 2b  
R2 = 0.03, F(5, 113) = 0.72, p > .1 R2 = 0.05, F(5, 346) = 3.37, p < .01  
B SE t-value p B SE t-value p 
Constant 0.860 0.037 40.720 *** 0.769 0.024 32.146 *** 
Concern -0.017 0.022 -0.802 ns -0.019 0.014 −1.394 ns 
Punishment 0.032 0.053 0.614 ns 0.085 0.034 2.520 * 
Punishment by concern -0.007 0.032 -0.203 ns 0.009 0.014 0.464 ns 
Reward 0.030 0.053 0.576 ns 0.111 0.034 3.263 *** 
Reward by concern -0.007 0.031 -0.224 ns 0.005 0.015 0.312 ns   
Intention to join the DR program (dependent variable)  
Study 2a Study 2b  
R2 = 0.22, F(6, 112) = 5.34, p < .001 R2 = 0.12, F(4, 347) = 11.80, p < .001  
B SE t-value p B SE t-value p 
Constant 3.977 0.575 6.916 *** 2.624 0.318 8.265 *** 
Concern -0.542 0.140 −3.862 *** -0.300 0.091 −3.294 *** 
Ratio self-to-collective interest 0.672 0.608 1.105 ns 1.944 0.357 5.444 *** 
Punishment 0.401 0.342 1.172 ns 0.527 0.227 2.323 * 
Punishment by concern 0.110 0.210 0.524 ns -0.144 0.134 −1.076 ns 
Reward (control) 0.332 0.342 0.971 ns 0.182 0.229 0.796 ns 
Reward by concern (control) 0.287 0.203 1.410 ns -0.212 0.128 1.650 +
Notes. *** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05 + p ≤ 0.1. 
Appendix F. – Wording of the measurements  
Construct Items 
Intention to join the DR program How likely are you to join the Flex program? 
How inclined are you to join the FLEX-program? 
How willing are you to join the FLEX-program? 
Loyalty towards the energy provider I will be a customer of my energy provider in the future. 
The chances of me staying with my energy provider are very high. 
The probability that I will try other energy services and products from my energy provider is very high. 
If someone asks me, I will speak positively of my energy provider. 
I would recommend my energy provider to a friend. 
Personal benefit I personally benefit if I join the FLEX-Program. 
Collective benefit Through joining the FLEX-Program, I create benefit for society. 
Joining the FLEX-Program is good for the environment. 
Concerns regarding the automated DR programs To what extent do you fear the following when thinking about joining the FLEX program?I will lose control over my household 
appliances. 
I cannot control what happens to my consumption data, and I am afraid that my consumption data will be abused. 
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